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ABSTRACT

Covert Botnet Implementation and Defense Against Covert Botnets

by

Lokesh Babu Ramesh Babu, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2009
Major Professor: Dr. Chad Mano
Department: Computer Science
The advent of the Internet and its benevolent use has benefited mankind in private
and business use alike. However, like any other technology, the Internet is often used for
malevolent purposes. One such malevolent purpose is to attack computers using botnets.
Botnets are stealthy, and the victims are typically unaware of the malicious activities and
the resultant havoc they can cause. Computer security experts seek to combat the botnet
menace. However, attackers come up with new botnet designs that exploit the
weaknesses in existing defense mechanisms and, thus, continue to evade detection.
Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the weaknesses of existing defense
mechanisms to find the lacunae in them and design new models of bot infection before
the attackers do so. It is also necessary to validate the analysis and the design of such a
model by implementing the attack and fine-tuning the design. This thesis validates the
weaknesses found in existing defense mechanisms against botnets by implementing a
new model of botnet and carrying out experiments on it.
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To merely analyze and present the weaknesses of a defense would open the door
for attackers and make their job easier. Thus, creating a defense mechanism against the
new attack is equally important. This thesis proposes a design against the new model of
bot infection and also implements the design. Experiments were conducted to validate
and fine-tune the design and eliminate flaws in the new defense mechanism.
(89 pages)
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The Internet is a global system of computer networks that enable transfer of
information in the form of web pages, email, and other messaging services between users
in different parts of the world. Prior to 1990, it was the exclusive domain of tech savvy
people, such as educators, and researchers; however, now it is being used both by tech
savvy people as well as people with less technological expertise. Companies have set up
websites on the Internet to provide services to their customers much more effectively.
People from all walks of life commonly use the Internet for such activities as buying
products, communicating with friends, and performing online banking within the comfort
of their homes. Not only are billions of dollars transacted everyday online, but people
also give out personal information online when they use Internet.
E-commerce websites make huge money through online trading. When the
Internet was restricted to only educational and research institutions, computer security
was not a huge issue; however, with the current widespread use of the Internet, computer
security has become very important. Easy access to the Internet has benefited people in a
large way, but unfortunately, it has also given wider scope for attackers to target
computers and cause huge damage. If businesses’ websites providing services for their
customers were to go down, the business entities would suffer huge financial losses as a
result of the denial-of-service to users.
The Internet has also led to new types of advertising models, such as pay-perclick. In this type of model, websites display advertisements in their web pages. When a
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user clicks on these advertisements, the advertiser pays the websites hosting these
advertisements. Unfortunately, this innovation has led to a new model of fraud, known as
the click fraud. In this type of fraud, an automated program clicks on the ad to generate a
charge per click. The website displaying these ads can easily create the automated
program to get greater revenue.
Communication has been revolutionized with the advent of Internet; there has
been a huge increase in the use of email for both private and professional purposes alike
over the years. Again, the widespread use of email has led to devious ways of exploiting
such usage. Unsolicited email, commonly referred to as spam, is also on the rise. Spam
overloads email inboxes with worthless messages, causing annoyance. Even more
damaging, Spam also harms Internet service providers by overloading mail servers,
leading to nondelivery of legitimate email. Additionally, the Internet service provider
may get blacklisted because of spammers who misuse their service to send spam. This
leads to a loss of business as well as the loss of the reputation of an Internet service
provider.
A botnet [1, 2, 3] is one of the techniques used for execution of malicious
activities including denial-of-service, click fraud, identity theft, and spamming attacks. A
botnet is a collection of compromised computers in a network. The compromised
computer has a malicious application known as a bot. There can be tens of thousands of
bots in a bot network. Typically, botnets consist of a remote command and control (C&C)
server that controls the bots in a network and is referred to as the bot herder or bot
master.
A typical bot infection model consists of the following steps.
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1. The remote C&C server scans computers in a network to find vulnerabilities.
Vulnerability is a bug in software that allows applications to access protected
resources and perform privileged actions.
2. The vulnerability is exploited.
3. The bot binary is downloaded and executed in the computer.
4. The bot then establishes communication with the remote C&C server to receive
and execute commands to perform malicious actions (denial-of-service, identity
theft, spamming, etc.).
5. The bot next seeks to infect computers in other networks.
6. The first two steps are repeated with each computer in the network by the Remote
C&C server.
Since, botnets are stealthy; they cause huge damage to victims, whether they be
private citizens or business entities. According to the FBI there are “over one million
potential victims of botnet cyber crime” [4:1]. Unlike viruses, which act individually,
bots receive commands from the remote C&C server and then execute coordinated
attacks. A denial-of-service attack is carried out by having the entire set of bots request a
page from a web server repeatedly within a short span of time, thereby overwhelming the
server. This causes legitimate requests to time out, causing a disruption in service. Storm
worm [5, 6] is a botnet that made massive parallel network calls to anti-spam websites,
such as spameater.com and anti spam groups such as Spamhaus project, thus overloading
the servers' capacities and preventing them from responding to requests [7].
Spamming is another malicious activity carried out by bots. First, the remote
C&C server sends the spam email to all the bots along with the list of email addresses.
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The bots then send the spam email to the email address present in the list. Identification
of the actual source of the email spam becomes difficult as the email comes from various
sources. Conficker [8] is one such botnet that has a spam capacity of 10 billion per day
and has affected approximately three million computers worldwide [9].
Also, botnets have become effective tools for attackers to perpetrate click fraud;
in this case, bots are usually plug-ins to popular browsers. The bot runs within the
process space of the browser and has access to the document object model of a web
page. The bots make HTTP requests to get the page containing the advertisement and
mimic a legitimate user by clicking on the advertisement. Again, it is difficult for
advertisers to determine whether the click was from a legitimate user or a bot, given that
IP addresses are diverse. Clickbot.A [10] is a click fraud botnet used to attack syndicated
search engines, and it has infected more than 100, 000 computers.
People give out confidential information, such as their passwords, social security
numbers, and credit card data, while performing transactions online and this information
is of special interest to attackers. The bot installed in a computer monitors the keystrokes
to collect this confidential information and pass it on to the bot master. Since users do not
realize that their computers have been compromised, they continue to perform online
transactions, while the attacker uses the stolen information to make purchases without the
consent of the victims. The FBI prosecuted a person in Los Angeles for using botnets to
steal the identities of victims throughout the USA [11].
The first part of this thesis discusses the implementation of a covert botnet model;
the second discusses the design and implementation of a defense against such a model.
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1.1 Implementation of a Covert Botnet Model
A new model for a bot infection [12] has been theoretically proposed. Current
detection mechanisms such as BotHunter [13] analyze existing communication patterns
of botnets with the Internet to identify a bot infection. The new model differs from
existing models in its communication patterns with the Internet. Said communication
patterns enable the new model to maintain stealth while at the same time maintain contact
with the remote bot master to carry out malicious actions on its behalf. This thesis
elaborates on the implementation of the new model and describes the experiments
conducted to show that the new model is capable of carrying out malicious actions like
those of existing bot infection models. The experiments also demonstrate the proposed
model maintains stealth and evades detection from current detection mechanisms such as
BotHunter.
1.2 Design and Implementation of Defense Against Covert Botnet
A defense mechanism against the new model of bot infection has been designed
and implemented. This adds to the existing capability of BotHunter, enabling it to detect
the new bot infection model proposed in [12]. The key components of this defense
mechanism are:
1. BotHunter. This monitors communication with the Internet by analyzing
the network traffic entering and leaving the router.
2. Local Traffic Monitoring System. This analyzes the traffic entering and
leaving network switches. The responsibility of this system is to detect the
malicious actions in the local network and communicate them to
BotHunter. BotHunter uses the information provided by the local traffic
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monitoring system and correlates it with its own analysis to detect the bot
infection.
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CHAPTER 2
RELATED WORK
Initially, internet relay chat (IRC) servers were created for benevolent purposes to
allow people having IRC clients to chat together, exchange files, etc.; however, this
architecture has been put to malicious use, and IRC servers have been used as remote
C&Cs server to control thousands of bots [14, 15]. Attackers use IRC channels to
transmit a bot and infect vulnerable computers. The bots that contain IRC client code
subsequently communicate with the IRC servers to download commands to carry out
malicious actions [14, 16].
Agobot [17] is an example of a bot that relies on a centralized remote C&C server
and is capable of executing denial-of-service attacks, spamming, and sniffing passwords.
The technique to track and investigate botnets is called botnet tracking [18].One way of
detecting botnets that rely on a central C&C server is to analyze the traffic in known IRC
ports for strings that match known commands [1]. Also, techniques to detect Botnet
C&C channels in network traffic have also been proposed [19]. Another option is to
create a honeypot [20] system consisting of vulnerable systems waiting to be infected by
a bot. Once infected, they are used to locate the IRC servers. Bots are then created by
system administrators to connect back to the IRC server to profile it.
Some botnets use peer-to-peer networks [21, 22] for communication. They differ
from centralized command and control botnets in their network characteristics [17]. Peerto-peer bots can act as clients and as servers and communicate with other peer bots
instead of a central C&C server [17]. Their design is complex, and detection is,
consequently, difficult. One of the key advantages of peer-to-peer botnets is resiliency,
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as opposed to centralized botnets that fail when the centralized C&C server dies.
Nugache is one such peer-to-peer botnet. It opens a backdoor on TCP port 8 and is
capable of running as a Web server or performs a denial-of-service attack [23]. It has
been predicted that peer-to-peer botnets will become more widespread than centralized
command and control botnets [17]. The most widespread peer-to-peer bot observed in
the wild is storm worm. Though detection of peer-to-peer botnets is difficult since there
is no central command server, techniques to detect and mitigate peer-to-peer botnets have
been proposed [24].
2.1 BotHunter
The authors of [12] assume that BotHunter [13] is the best tool for detecting
botnets in a local network. BotHunter uses an infection dialog correlation strategy. “In
dialog correlation, bot infections are modeled as a set of loosely ordered communication
flows that are exchanged between an internal host and one or more external entities”
[13:2]. The infection dialog consists of the following five events.
1. External to Internal Inbound Scan. The remote command and control server scans
computers for vulnerabilities. This is classified as an E1 event by BotHunter.
2. External to Internal Inbound Exploit. The bot binary is sent to the vulnerable
computer by exploiting the vulnerability. This is classified as an E2 event by
BotHunter.
3. Internal to External Binary Acquisition. The Bot binary is downloaded by the
computer from the remote command and control server by the bot. This is
classified as an E3 event by BotHunter.
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4. Internal to External Command and Control Communication. The Bot downloads
commands from the remote command and control server. This is classified as an
E4 event by BotHunter.
5. Internal to External Outbound Infection Scanning. The Bot tries to infect
computers in other networks. This is classified as an E5 event by BotHunter.
BotHunter uses Snort [25, 26] an intrusion detection system to monitor the traffic
entering and leaving a network and detect the above events. BotHunter maintains a
history of events detected in a computer, and it detects a Bot infection exists in a
computer, if either of the following two conditions is met.
Condition 1. A computer performs an E2 event followed by an E3, E4, or E5
event.
Condition 2. A computer performs at least two of the events E3, E4, or E5.
2.2 Covert Botnet Model of Communication
As stated previously, a new model of bot infection dialog has been proposed in
[12]. It proposes alternatives to the events mentioned in Section 2.1.
1. A2 Event: Internal to Internal Exploits. The bots local to the network are
responsible for infecting other computers in the network.
2. A3 Event: Internal to Internal Binary Acquisition. The bot that downloads the
binary from the remote command and control server is responsible for
communicating the binary to other bots in the network.
3. A4 Event: Internal to Internal Command and Control Communication. The
bot which downloads the command from the remote command and control
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server is responsible for communicating the command to other bots in the
network.
The model proposed in [12] makes the following assumptions about an initial infection.
1. At least one computer will be infected and obtain the bot binary in some way.
2. The "initial infection avoids detection by some means such as those proposed
in [8]" [12:4].
Once the initial infection is completed, the botnet formation proceeds. With the
above assumption, the proposed model seeks to evade detection by ensuring that the
conditions specified for bot infection detection are not satisfied.
2.2.1

Negating Detection Conditions
Condition 1. The bot in the initially infected host tries to infect other computers in

the local network. This move is to reduce the number of E2 event from happening. If
another computer had been compromised through an E2 event, it will not perform an E3
or E5 event. Instead, it will seek to obtain the binary or commands from other bots within
the local network. This prevents Condition 1 from being satisfied.
Condition 2. BotHunter maintains the history of events that were detected in a
computer and correlates these events to detect a bot infection. So, if BotHunter detects at
least two of the E3-E5 events on the same computer, it signals a bot Infection. In the
proposed model of bot infection, actions such as bot binary download and command
acquisition (E3, E4 events), are not performed by the same bot.
At any point in time, only one bot will communicate with the remote C&C server
to perform bot binary download or command acquisition. This bot is the local bot leader,
also known as the token bot. The token bot also propagates the binary download or
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command acquisition to other bots in the network. This eliminates the need for other
bots to contact the remote C&C server. BotHunter does not monitor the traffic that is
local to the network and will not see this propagation.
After performing the action, this token bot relinquishes the post of token bot and
passes the leadership to another bot in the network. If the previous token bot has done the
binary acquisition, the new token bot performs the command acquisition, and if the
previous token bot has done the command acquisition, the new bot performs the
command binary acquisition. Since the same bot does not perform both the actions,
condition two is not satisfied. This enables the botnet to evade detection by BotHunter
and maintain its stealth.
2.2.2 Peer List Update
In addition to binary and command acquisition, the bot also requests a list of
remote command and control servers. This enables bots to maintain contact with the
external network even if one of the remote command and control servers fails. “The Peer
list update and command update request would both fall under behavior indicative of
internal to external Botnet communication (E4)” [12:7].
2.2.3 Information Stored in a Botnet
Each bot in the network maintains information about its binary version, the
actions (E3, E4 events) it has performed, and the timestamp for each action. In addition,
bots maintain information about other bots in the network. Information about other bots
includes the binary version of a given bot, the actions (E3, E4 events) it has performed,
and the timestamp for each. This information is called a report list.
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In addition to the above information, the token bot maintains information on
the last two external actions performed (E3 or E4) in the botnet (the action history), the
action the token bot has performed, and the timestamp of that action. This information is
referred to as a token. When a new bot becomes the token bot, the token information is
passed to it.
2.2.4 Sub-Botnet Management
For successful operation of the bot network, each of the bots in the network has to
coordinate with each other to determine the needed actions, elect a token bot, etc. This is
done by exchange of a predefined set of messages among the bots.
2.2.5 Token Acquisition Broadcast (TAB)
When a bot enters the token bot state, it broadcasts a message known as the token
Acquisition message which contains the action to be done by this bot. This message also
indicates to the other bots that this bot has become the new token bot.

2.2.6 Token Report Request Broadcast
The token bot then sends out a token report request broadcast (TRRB) so that it
can get the list of active bots in the network. The token bot compiles a new report list
based on the active bots present in the network.

2.2.7 Token Report Request Response
On receiving the TRRB, each bot in the network, replies to the token bot with
information about itself. This is called a token report request response (TRRR). The
information consists of the MAC address of the host in which the bot resides, the bot
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binary version, the action it has performed (if the bot has previously been a token bot),
and the timestamp of the action.
2.2.8 Token Action Result Propagation
A token action result propagation (TARP) message is sent after the token bot has
performed an action. The TARP is sent to all the other bots in the network and it contains
the status of the action performed and the report list compiled after the TRRB. If the bot
has successfully downloaded a new bot binary, an “action success” status and the version
of the new bot binary is sent in the TARP. If the bot has successfully obtained a new
command, an “action success” status is sent in the TARP. On receipt of this message,
other bots perform a binary download (A3 event) or command acquisition (A4 event)
from the token bot.
2.2.9 Token Pass
After sending the TARP message, the token bot scans the action history to
determine which action needs to be performed next and decides on the next token bot
based on the following three rules.
1. If there is a bot that has not performed any actions, it is selected as the
next token bot; if more than one bot has not performed any actions, one of
them is chosen arbitrarily.
2. If there is no bot that has not performed any actions, the token is passed to
the bot whose last action matches the next action to be done. If more than
one bot matches the action, the one with the oldest timestamp is chosen as
the next token bot.
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3. If there no such bots that satisfy the above two criterion, the bot with
the oldest timestamp, irrespective of the action it performed is selected as
the next token bot.
2.2.10 Token Election
When a bot initially starts, it sends out a message to check whether a token bot
already exists. If there is no response from the token bot, it sends a token election (TE)
message. The bot waits for a predefined time interval to receive the report list from other
bots. On receipt of this message, the other bots in the network send their report lists. The
bot that initiated the token election scans through the report list sent by the other bots and
updates its own report list if it is older than the ones received. The bot scans the report list
to determine the last two actions performed and then determines the action needing to be
performed next. The bot scans the report list again to find the bot whose last action
matches the action to be performed next and passes the token to this bot.
2.2.11 Covert Bot States
A Bot can be one of in three states:
1. Token Bot. Communicates with external peer, and perform actions (E3, E4
events).
2. Nontoken Bot. Communicates with token bot to get the results of the latest
actions performed by the token bot.
3. Token Election. Enters this state when no token bot is present. The
purpose is to determine which bot in the network will become the token
bot.
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Figure 1 illustrates the various states a bot can be at any given time. Table 1
shows the events on which transitions takes place. On startup, the bot checks to see
whether a token bot is present. If a token bot is present in the network, the bot transitions
to a nontoken bot state. If a token bot is not present, the bot initiates a token election.
There are two possible outcomes to a token election for the initiating bot. It can either
win the election in which case it moves to a token bot state, it can lose the election to
another bot, in which case it move to a nontoken bot state.
A bot in a nontoken bot state can move into the token election state, if a token bot
is unresponsive after it sends out a token acquisition broadcast or if it does not send a
TARP message. A bot in a token bot state proceeds to a nontoken bot state after a
successful Token Pass. A Bot in a nontoken bot state proceeds to a token bot state after
receiving a token pass.
2.3 Signature-Aware Traffic Monitoring with IPFIX
The authors of [27] propose a signature-aware traffic monitoring system that uses
the IPFIX [28] standard. Internet protocol flow information export (IPFIX) is the
universal standard for export of flow information to enable network measurement,
accounting, and billing [29].
A flow is a set of packets having the same properties, such IP source, destination,
protocol, etc., observed in a specific period of time. A metering process located at a
router or switch analyzes network traffic and aggregates information into flow records.
The exporter process then transmits the flow information from the metering process to
the collectors. The data collected from the various exporters is subsequently used for
network measurement.
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Figure 1. Covert bot states.
Table 1. Events.
Events
b1
b2
b3
b4
b5
b6
b7

Description
Token Bot present in Botnet
Token Bot absent in Botnet
Bot loses Token Election
Bot wins Token Election
Token Bot is unresponsive
Token Pass received
Token Pass sent

The monitoring system proposed in [27] consists of signature inspectors that
inspect payloads in traffic for signatures and record the signature id of the signature
found in the IPFIX compliant flow record. The authors use Snort [25, 26] as their
example for signature inspector. The flow record is exported to the IPFIX compliant flow
collector, which in turn forwards it to the flow analyzer. The flow analyzer classifies
flows with the signature id given in the flow records, to reveal hidden anomaly traffic
patterns.
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The key differences between the defense outlined in [27] and the design of the
defense mechanism for detecting a covert botnet model of bot infection proposed and
implemented in this thesis are:
1. The example cited for signature inspector by the authors [27] is Snort which
contains a huge database of signatures. Having a signature inspector such as Snort
at each monitoring point including switches means replicating the enormous
database. Such replication is not necessary for detecting the covert botnet model
of bot infection. One centrally located database of signatures and replicating only
the detection engine in the monitoring points will suffice. For more details, see
Section 4.4.1.
The disadvantages of having a huge database of signatures at each monitoring
points are;
•

Redundancy of the signature database, as the database needs to be
replicated at each monitoring point.

•

Increased computational requirements to analyze the traffic with a huge
database of signatures.

•

Increased memory to store the database of signatures.

•

Increased time to analyze the traffic.

2. The authors of [27] send the signature id as part of the user data in the flow
information. This information is used for flow classification to detect anomaly
traffic; however, this classification alone is not useful for detecting the covert
botnet model of bot infection. In the proposed model, the dialog correlation
strategy proposed by the authors of [13] is extended to include the communication
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flows between the internal hosts, in addition to the communication flows that
are exchanged between the internal host and external entities. This enables
detection of the covert botnet model of bot infection.
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CHAPTER 3
IMPLEMENTATION OF COVERT BOTNET
This chapter describes the implementation details of the covert bot. In addition, it
describes the implementation of other components needed to validate the new covert
botnet model. This chapter also outlines the flaw in the new model and presents solutions
to solve the flaws. The experimental setup to validate the model is explained. The
various experiments performed and the results obtained are discussed in this chapter.
3.1 Covert Botnet Framework
The construction of the botnet framework consisted of a programmatic design and
implementation of the following components. Table 2 lists the components in the
framework.
•

Covert Bot. This application simulates a bot and is responsible for maintaining
contact with external peers to perform binary updates or command updates (E3,
E4 events). This communication is illustrated by “Covert Bot 1” downloading a
new binary from the External Peer in Figure 2. The bot also propagates the new
binary (A3 event) or commands (A4 event) obtained from the external peer to
other bots in the botnet.

•

External Peer Application. This application simulates a remote command and
control server and is responsible for sending new versions of the bot binary (E3
event), commands (E4 event) for carrying out malicious actions, and external peer
lists (E4 event) to the covert bot.
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•

Vulnerable Application. In the real world, the remote C&C server exploits
vulnerability in a computer to perform the infection. Vulnerability in a computer
may be software bugs that allow software applications to access protected
resources, which can result in an application performing privileged actions like
downloading malicious binaries from the Internet and executing them. The
vulnerable application implemented for the covert bot framework is a component
that simulates vulnerability in the computer. The covert bot exploits this
vulnerability to perform the initial infection in the computer (A2 event) as
illustrated by “Covert Bot 2” infecting uninfected computer 3 in Figure 2.

3.2 External Peer Application
This application is written in C++. It is a TCP socket-based server program and is
used to simulate the remote command and control server. It runs on a Linux desktop that
is connected to the router, as illustrated in Figure 2. The application listens on a
predefined port and depending on the type of request from the Bot, sends the new bot
binary, command, or peer list to the requesting bot.
3.3 Vulnerable Application
This application is written in C++ and is used to simulate the vulnerability in a
computer. It is a TCP socket-based server program and is hosted on all the computers in
the local network, as illustrated in Figure 2. The application listens on a predefined port
and receives the binary from other bots to create the initial infection (A2 event) in the
computer. This application saves the received binary, changes its permission mode to
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Table 2. Covert Botnet Components and Actions.
Components
Covert Bot
External Peer Application
Vulnerable Application

Actions
Perform A2, A3, A4 events.
Perform E2, E3, E4 events.
This Application simulates vulnerability in
a computer. Covert Bot exploits this
vulnerability to perform the initial
infection.

execute, and assigns it root privileges. The bot binary is then executed by the vulnerable
application.
3.4 Covert Bot
This application is written in C++. This is the main application that implements
the functionality for covert botnet communication in a private subnet. It is a multithreaded program.
3.4.1 Functions
The bot performs three important functions. These operations are essential to the
working of the botnet.
1. Communicate with external peers (E3, E4 events)
2. Infect other computers in the network (A2 event)
3. Communicate with internal peers (A3,A4 events)
3.4.2 Modules
The Bot consists of four modules.
1. Network attack module.
2. Message listener module.
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Figure 2. Covert botnet framework.
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3. Process module, which is further subdivided into two categories:
•

Token bot module

•

Nontoken bot module.

4. Internal binary update module.
3.4.3 Network Attack Module
The network attack module (NAM) runs on a separate thread. Its main purpose is
to perform the initial infection of the other computers in the local network. It sends a
special message to check whether a computer is infected. If a bot is present in a
computer, the bot indicates that the computer is infected in its response. If there is no
response from the computer, the NAM establishes contact with the vulnerable application
and sends the bot binary to it (A2 event) to create the initial infection in the computer, as
illustrated in the Figure 3.
3.4.4 Message Listener Module
The message listener module runs on a separate thread. This is a raw socket-based
server module that listens on a predefined port for messages from other bots in the
network. On receipt of any message, it is dispatched to the process module which is
responsible for processing the message. The primary idea behind the separation of
listening and processing of messages is to ensure that no messages are lost during the
processing of messages.
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Figure 3. Network attack module.

3.4.5 Process Module
The process module runs on a separate thread. It receives messages from the
message listener module, and if the bot is running as a token bot, the process module
dispatches messages, such as token acquisition broadcast, token report request broadcast
(TRRB), token acquisition report, and the Token Pass, to the nontoken bot module.
Figure 4 illustrates the dispatch of messages to the different modules depending
on the type of message. The process module is also responsible for conducting the token
election. This is performed when the token bot is unresponsive. The TE message is
broadcast in the network, and on receipt of this message, other bots in the network
respond with their report list.
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If the report list of the bot that initiated the TE is older than the report list
received from other bots, it updates its report list. The bot waits a predefined time period
to receive the report list sent by other bots. After the expiration of the time period, it
scans through the report list, to determine the next token bot and passes the token to it.
3.4.6 Token Bot Module
This module is responsible for performing actions, such as downloading the new
binary, command, or peer list (E3, E4 events), from the external peer application and
propagating the result of the action to rest of the bots in the network. As illustrated in
Figure 5, the Token Bot module first sends the TAB message to all the bots in the
network indicating that it is the new token bot. This action is followed by the TRRB
message. On receiving the TRRB, each bot in the network, replies to the token bot with
the information about itself. The information consists of the MAC address of the host in
which the bot resides, the bot binary version, the actions it performed (if the bot has been
a token bot previously), and the timestamp at which the action was performed.
After waiting a fixed period of time and there are no more TRRR responses, this
module compiles the new report list. It subsequently performs the action (E3, E4 events)
and sends out the status of the action and the new report list as part of the TARP
message. After receiving the TARP acknowledgement, it determines the next token bot
and performs a token pass to that bot and transfers control to the nontoken bot module.
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3.4.7 Nontoken Bot Module
This module is responsible for responding to the TRRB message from the token
bot. This module creates the TRRR message which consists of the last action performed
by the bot when it was the token bot, the time at which it was performed, and the MAC
address of the computer in which the bot resides.
If a new binary has been downloaded by the token bot, this module requests the
latest binary from the token bot. It is also responsible for sending the TARP
acknowledgement on receipt of the TARP message from the token bot. If the token bot
does not send a TRRB or does not respond to the TARP acknowledgement, the nontoken
bot module transfers control to the process module which performs the token election.
Figure 6 illustrates the program flow in the module.
3.4.8 Internal Binary Update Module
This module is responsible for propagating the binary downloaded by the token
bot to other bots in the network. If a new binary has been downloaded by the token bot,
this is specified in the TARP message that is sent to other bots. On receipt of this
information, the bots request the binary from the token bot. The internal binary update
module in the token bot sends the new binary to the requesting bot (A3 event). As shown
in Figure 7, it can be seen that the Covert Bot 2 requests the latest binary from the token
bot, and the internal binary update module sends the new binary to Covert Bot 2.
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3.4.9 Messages
For the successful operation of the bot network, each of the bots in the network
has to coordinate with the other bots to determine what action needs to be done, which
bot becomes the next token bot, etc. This is done by exchange of a predefined set of
messages amongst the bots. The important component of all the messages is the code that
indicates the type of message. The code and the message type it identifies are show in
Table 3.
3.4.10 Data Sharing and Synchronization
This project utilized a thread safe queue to share the data among the various
threads. The messages that are received from other bots are put into the thread safe
queue. The modules in the bot that are running on various threads wait in the queue, and
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Table 3. Message Types.
Code
A
B
C
D
E

Message Type
Token Acquisition Broadcast (TAB)
Token Report Request Broadcast (TRRB)
Token Report Request Response (TRRR)
Token Action Result Propagation (TARP)
Token Pass (TP)

once a message is received, they are popped out and processed. The covert bot uses the
Posix [30] thread libraries for thread creation and synchronization.
Example:

A queue is shared between the message listener module and the

process module. The message received

by the message listener module is pushed into

the queue, and a signal is sent to the process module indicating receipt of the new
message. On receipt of the signal, the process module pops the message from the queue
and processes it.
3.4.11 Stealth
The covert bot sniffs on the local traffic to obtain the IP Address and the MAC
address from DHCP requests and ARP responses. This helps the covert bot to find new
computers to attack in the local network. When the covert bot communicates with other
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bots in the network, ARP requests are generated by the switch, if the MAC addresses
are not present in the ARP cache in the host and sent to the router. This information can
be picked up by an intrusion detection system that monitors the router. In order to prevent
the generation of ARP requests, the IP address and the MAC address obtained from
sniffing the network traffic are stored in the ARP cache in the host, thus increasing the
stealth.
3.4.12 TCP
Communication between the external peer and the internal bots like a binary
download and command acquisition (E3, E4 events) is done using TCP. The binary that
is propagated (A3 event) to other bots in the local network is also through TCP. This is
because the maximum size of data that can be sent thru the MAC layer is 1500 bytes,
whereas the typical covert bot binary size is in the region 100 - 500 kb.
3.4.13 Persistent Storage
The bots run in the background on the computer as a Linux service and, hence, do
not require manual intervention for startup.

Information, such as the last action

performed by the bot, the timestamp, binary version of the bot, and the report list, is
stored in a file upon bot shutdown as this information is critical in determining the next
token bot during a token pass.
If the bot does not store in persistent storage the last action it performed, the bot
might perform an action that would satisfy either of the two conditions needed for
detection by BotHunter. This is illustrated by the following scenario. Let ‘T’ be the
threshold of BotHunter, let four be the size of the Botnet, and assume that none of the
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bots have performed any action initially. A recap of the rules for selecting the next
token bot is as follows.
1.

If there is a bot that has not done any action, it is selected as the next token
bot. If there are more than one bot that have not done any action, one of them
is chosen arbitrarily.

2. If the first rule is not satisfied, the token is passed to the bot whose last action
matches the next action to be done in the botnet.
3. If there are no such bots that satisfy the above two rules, the bot that has the
oldest timestamp is selected as the next token bot.
As shown in Table 4, at time t1, Bot 1 performs the binary update. It then selects
Bot 2 as the next token bot based on rule 1. On becoming the new token bot, Bot 2
performs the command update, during which time the computer hosting Bot 1 is
shutdown. Bot 2 then passes the token to Bot 3 based on rule 1, and after Bot 3 performs
its action, it transfers the token to Bot 4.
When Bot 4 performs the TRRB, Bot 1 starts up again. Since Bot 4 does not have
persistent storage, it has no way of knowing the last action performed. Hence, it indicates
that it has not performed any action in the token report request response message sent to
Bot 4. During the token pass, Bot 4 selects a bot based on rule 1. Bot 1 then downloads
the new command at t6. Since two events (binary download at t1 and command
download at t6) are performed before T, the threshold time of BotHunter, the bot
infection is signaled by BotHunter.

33
However if all Bots maintained persistent storage, then it can be seen from
Table 5 that Bot 1 sends the last action performed by it on receipt of the TRRB message
from Bot 4. Bot 4 subsequently selects Bot 2 as the next Token Bot as it satisfies rule 2.

Table 4. Scenario 1 – No Persistent Storage.
Time
t1

Action
Bot 1 performs Binary Update (E3) and passes token to Bot 2.

t2

Bot 2 performs Command update and passes token to Bot 3

t3

Computer hosting Bot 1 is shutdown.

t4

Bot 3 performs Peer List Update and passes token to Bot 4.

t5

Bot 4 performs Binary update. Bot 1 starts up and Bot 4 passes token
to Bot 1

t6

Bot 1 performs Command update (E4). Since E3 and E4 are under
pruning threshold time T of BotHunter, the Bot infection is identified
by BotHunter.

Table 5. Scenario 2 –Persistent Storage.
Time
t1

Action
Bot 1 performs Binary Update and passes token to Bot 2.

t2

Bot 2 performs Command & Control and passes token to Bot 3.

t3

Bot 1 goes down

t4

Bot 3 performs Peer List Update and passes token to Bot 4.

t5

Bot 4 performs Binary update. Bot 1 starts up reads the last action
and passes the last action to Bot 4. Bot 4 selects Bot 2 as next Token
Bot based on rule 2.

t6

Bot 2 performs Command update.
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3.5 Analysis of Existing Botnet Model
3.5.1 Experiment Setup
•

Bot Application. This application simulated a bot that relies on the existing bot
infection model. It was written in C++.

It performs binary downloads and

external port scan.
•

External Command and Control(C&C) Server. This application simulated the
remote command and control server. When a bot requests a bot binary, the bot
binary is sent to it through TCP.

•

Local Network. The local network was simulated on VMware [31], and the
network size was ten. It also consisted of a Linux desktop that hosted BotHunter.

•

External Network. The external network consisted of two computers. One of them
hosted the remote command and control (C&C) server. The other one simulated a
computer on which the port scan was performed by the bots.

•

Operating System. Ubuntu Linux.
Figure 8 illustrates the experimental setup for the experiments. The computer

hosting BotHunter was directly connected to the router to analyze the traffic for detecting
E3, E4, and E5 events. The Bot in infected computers performed a binary download
followed up by a command download or port scan.
3.5.2 Experiment 1
The objective of Experiment 1 was to show that the experimental setup simulates
an actual network containing BotHunter and the bots. The binary download and the
command download (E3 and E4 events) were performed by the bots within the
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threshold time. The BotHunter threshold was set at 5 minutes. The sequence of actions
performed by the Bot is shown in Table 6.
The bots were programmed to perform E3 and E4 events every 30 seconds. As
seen in Table 6, Bot 1 performed the binary download, followed by the command update
within 30 seconds of the binary update. Since the events were conducted within the
threshold time period, the botnet was detected by BotHunter.
3.5.3 Experiment 2
The objective of Experiment 2 was to show that BotHunter will not flag a bot
infection when E3 and E4 events are not done within the threshold time period. The
BotHunter threshold time period was set at 5 minutes. The sequence of actions performed
by the Bot is shown in Table 7.
The Bots were programmed to perform E3 andE4 events every 5 minutes and 30
seconds. As shown in Table 7, Bot 1 performed the binary download, followed by the
Table 6. BotHunter Detection.
Time(MM:SS)
00:00
00:30
01:00
01:30
02:00
02:30

Action
Bot 1 performed
Binary Download(E3)
Bot 1 performed
Command update(E4)
Bot 2 performed
Binary Download(E3)
Bot 2 performed
Command update(E4)
Bot 3 performed
Binary Download(E3)
Bot 3 performed
Command update(E4)

BotHunter Result
Detection – Profile generated

Detection – Profile generated

Detection – Profile generated

37
Table 7. BotHunter Evasion.
Time(MM:SS)

Action

0:05

Bot 1 performs Binary
Download(E3)
Bot 1 performs External
Port Scan(E5)
Bot 2 performs Binary
Download(E3)
Bot 2 performs External
Port Scan(E5)
Bot 3 performs Binary
Download(E3)
Bot 3 performs External
Port Scan(E5)

5:35
11:05
16:35
22:05
27:35

BotHunter Result
No Detection since E3, E5 do not occur
within the threshold time
No Detection since E3, E5 do not occur
within the threshold time
No Detection since E3, E5 do not occur
within the threshold time

command download after 5 minutes and 30 seconds of the binary download. Since the
events were not conducted in the same threshold time period, the Botnet was not detected
by BotHunter.
3.5.4 Experiment 3
The experiments were conducted for 50 minutes; BotHunter threshold was set at 5
minutes. Figure 9 shows the results of the three experiments, each with a different
number of actions per BotHunter threshold time period. The first experiment was
conducted with two actions (E3, E4 events) being conducted within the threshold time
period, as illustrated in Figure 9. This resulted in detection of bot by BotHunter.
The second experiment was conducted with the bot performing only one action
per threshold time. Ten actions were performed by the bot within the 50 minutes. The
third experiment was conducted with one action per twice the threshold time period. This
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Figure 9. Number of actions over time graph.
resulted in no detection by BotHunter, but the number of actions was reduced to five
during the same 50-minute time period.
3.6 Analysis of Covert Botnet
3.6.1 Experiment Setup
•

Covert Bot Application. This application simulated the covert bot. It was
written in C++. It was responsible for performing the binary, command, and
peer list download (E3, E4 events) from the external peer and propagating
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these actions (A3, A4 events) to other covert bots in the local network. It was
also responsible for performing the initial infection (A2 event) in other computers
in the local network.
•

External Peer Application. This application simulated the remote command and
control server. When a bot requests a bot binary, the bot binary is sent through
TCP.

•

Local Network. The local network was simulated on VMware, and the network
size was ten. It also consisted of a desktop computer that hosted BotHunter.

•

External Network. The external network consisted of one desktop computer,
which hosted the external peer application.

•

Operating System. Ubuntu Linux.
Figure 10 illustrates the experimental setup; all the infected computers hosted the

covert bot. The token bot downloaded the binary or command (E3, E4 events) from the
external peer application and propagated (A3, A4 events) it to the rest of the bots in the
local network. The BotHunter running a Linux desktop could trap the E3, E4 events as it
analyzed communication with the external network; however it could not identify the A3,
A4 events as it did not monitor the traffic within the local network.
3.6.2 Experiment
The objective of this experiment was to show that under the covert bot model,
BotHunter will not flag a bot infection even when E3 and E4 events are done within the
threshold time. The BotHunter threshold was set at 5 minutes. The covert bot
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was programmed to perform its action (E3, E4 event), followed by internal propagation
(A3, A4 event) ,and a token pass event every 1 minute and 30 seconds. The sequence of
actions performed by the bots is shown in Table 8.
As illustrated in Table 8, Bot 1 performed the binary download (E3 event) at 1
minute and 30 seconds. This latest binary was immediately propagated (A3 event) to the
other bots in the local network. Bot 1 next performed a token pass to Bot 2. Similarly,
Bot 2 performed the command download (E4 event) at 3 minutes, which was
immediately propagated (A4 event) to the other bots in the local network. It then did a
token pass to Bot 3. Even though the E3, E4 event was performed within the BotHunter’s

Table 8. Covert Botnet.
Time
(MM:SS)
01:30
03:00

Token
Bot
Bot 1
Bot 2

04:30

Bot 3

06:00
07:30

Bot 4
Bot 5

09:00

Bot 6

10:30
12:00

Bot 7
Bot 8

13:30

Bot 9

15:00
16:30

Bot 10
Bot 2

18:00

Bot 3

Action

Other Bots

Token Pass

Binary Download
Command
Download
Peer List
Download
Binary Download
Command
Download
Peer List
Download
Binary Download
Command
Download
Peer List
Download
Binary Download
Command
Download
Peer List
Download

A3 event
A4 event

Bot 2
Bot 3

A4 event

Bot 4

A3 event
A4 event

Bot 5
Bot 6

A4 event

Bot 7

A3 event
A4 event

Bot 8
Bot 9

A4 event

Bot 10

A3 event
A4 event

Bot 2
Bot 3

A4 event
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threshold time, they were performed by different bots. Further, since infection dialog
in BotHunter is tied to a single computer, this model evades detection by BotHunter.
3.6.3 Number of Actions Graph
Figure 11 shows the results of the two experiments, each with a different number
of actions per BotHunter threshold time period. The BotHunter threshold time period was
set at 5 minutes. In the first experiment, the bots were programmed to perform three
actions (binary download, command download, peer list download) at one-and-a-half
minute intervals. The three actions are shown in Figure 11 during the time interval
between 5 and 10 minutes. Within 18 minutes, 12 total actions were performed by the
bots. In the second experiment, the bots were programmed to perform actions (E3, E4
events) at intervals lower than one-and-a-half minutes, which resulted in 12 actions being
performed in less time.
The experiments show that in the covert botnet model, the bots could be
programmed to do any number of actions within the threshold time period as the model
negates the two conditions required for detection as discussed in Section 2.2.1. The only
drawback is the increase in network bandwidth because the increase in actions generates
increased traffic.
3.7 Comparison of Number of Bot Actions over Time
3.7.1 Existing Botnet Model
In order to evade detection, bot actions have to be spaced out by BotHunter
pruning threshold Time ‘T’. The BotHunter threshold time period was set at five minutes.
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Figure 11. Covert botnet - Number of actions over time.
It takes about an hour to perform 12 actions, as shown in Figure 12.
3.7.2 Covert Botnet Model
The bots were programmed to do three actions per threshold time period, and it
took 18 minutes to complete the 12 actions, as illustrated in Figure 12. Unlike the
existing botnet model wherein only one action can be done within the BotHunter
threshold time period in order to evade detection, the covert botnet model can do any
number of actions within the threshold time. Consequently, the bots could be

44

Figure 12. Comparison of number of bot actions over time.
programmed to perform more actions within the threshold time period, in which case the
time taken to complete 12 actions would be much less.
3.8 Comparison of External Network Traffic
3.8.1 Existing Botnet Model
If the size of the binary downloaded is S KBs, and the number of bots in the
network is N, the amount of traffic generated between the internal host and the external
peer is N*S KBs. This is because each bot has to download the bot binary from the

45
external peer. As can be seen in Figure 13, when the botnet size is 10 and the size of
the binary download is 165 KB, the total data downloaded from the external peer is 1650
KB. An increase in traffic could lead to possible detection by intrusion detection systems
that monitor the traffic entering a local network.
3.8.2 Covert Botnet
In the case of the covert botnet model, the amount of traffic generated between
the internal host and the external peer is a constant S. Since only one bot is going to
download the bot binary and distribute it to the other bots within the network. As can be
seen in Figure 13, irrespective of the size of the botnet, the traffic between the internal
host and the external peer is 165 KB which is the size of the bot binary.
3.9 Covert Botnet Connectivity
In a network, computers are shutdown either because of human intervention or
because of extraneous circumstances like a power failure. A computer that is shutdown
could contain a covert bot which is either in a token bot state or a nontoken bot state.
When the token bot is not alive, the connectivity with the external peer is lost, leading to
a breakdown in external communication. A loss of external communication means that
the bots do not have access to the latest binary and are not be able to perform malicious
activities, leading to a collapse of the bot network. To deal with this, the token election
process had been proposed in the covert botnet model.
Experiments were conducted to determine how effectively the token election
process restores the connectivity of the botnet when computers are shutdown and
restarted. The experiment was simulated on a VMware virtual network consisting of 30
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Figure 13. Comparison of external network traffic.

computers. The token pass was programmed to occur every 2 minutes. Actions such as
binary and command downloads were performed every 2 minutes.
In order to simulate computers containing a token bot shutting down, the bot in a
token bot state was programmed to generate a random number before performing a token
pass. If the number was within a threshold value, the bot did not respond to any message
from other bots in order to simulate an unresponsive bot. Upon not receiving any
responses from the token bot, the other bots would initiate a token election. Figure 14
illustrates the experimental setup. Each of the 30 computers in the setup contained a
covert bot.

47

External Network
External Peer Application

Router
BotHunter on Linux
Desktop

Hub
Physical Switch

VMware ESX server

Virtual Machine
1

Virtual Machine
30

Virtual Machine
…

Figure 14. Experiment setup.
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3.9.1 Covert Botnet Connectivity – Token Bot
The graph in Figure 15 below shows the connectivity of the bot network with the
external peer over time. The botnet is disconnected from the external peer when the
covert bot that is in token bot state becomes unresponsive. It is during said time that the
token election is conducted. On an average, it took about 5 minutes for a token election to
elect the new token bot and restore connectivity with the external peer.

Figure 15. Covert botnet connectivity – Token bot.

49
The graph in Figure 16 below shows the number of actions performed over
time when bots randomly become unresponsive. The number of actions over time
increased linearly.

Further, when a covert bot that was in a token bot state was

unresponsive, there was a temporary plateau due to a token election. The number of
actions again increased when a bot was elected as a token bot.

Figure 16. Covert bot actions over time with token election.
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3.9.2 Covert Botnet Connectivity - Nontoken Bot
The graph in Figure 17 below shows the connectivity a nontoken bot has with the
botnet. When a bot in nontoken bot state is unresponsive, its connectivity with the bot
network is lost. When the bot resumes, it sends out a special message to determine if a
token bot is present in the botnet. If a token bot is present, it responds to the message, and
the connectivity of the bot is instantly established.
If the bot resumes during a token election, the bot has to participate in the token
election process, and the connectivity of the bot is established when the token election is
complete.

Figure 17. Nontoken bot network connectivity with token election.
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3.10 Covert Botnet Flaws
3.10.1 Token Pass Flaw
The design for BotHunter evasion had a flaw that needed to be rectified. A recap
of the rules for selecting the next token bot follows.
1. If there is a bot that has not done any action, it is selected as the next token
bot. If more than one bots exist that has not done any action, one of them is
chosen arbitrarily.
2. If the first rule is not satisfied, the token is passed to the bot whose last action
matches the next action to be done in the botnet.
3. If there are no such bots that satisfy the above two rules, the bot that has the
oldest timestamp is selected as the next token bot.
The flaw is in rule 3.The following scenario illustrates the flaw. Let the botnet
size be four and the BotHunter threshold be T. As shown in Table 9, initially Bot 1

Table 9. Token Pass Flaw.
Tim
e
t1

Token Bot Action
Bot 1

Binary update

t2

Bot 2

t3

Bot 3

t4

Bot 4

Command
update
Peer List
Update
Binary Update

t5

Bot 1

Command
Update

Bot Hunter
Result

Bot Status
Bot 1
Alive
Bot 1
Alive
Bot 1
Alive
Bot 1
Alive
Bot 2

Bot 2
Alive
Bot 3
Alive
Bot 2
Alive
Bot 2
Dead
Bot 1

Bot 3
Alive
Bot 4
Alive
Bot 4
Alive
Bot 3
Alive
Bot 3

Detection/Profile
generated
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becomes the token bot and performs binary update; next Bot 2 becomes the token bot
and performs command update.
When Bot 4 becomes the token bot, the computer hosting Bot 2 is shutdown.
After completing the binary download, Bot 4 selects Bot 2 as the next token bot, since its
last action matches the next action to be performed, e.g., command update. However, Bot
2 is unresponsive. Subsequently, Bot 4 selects Bot 1 as the next Token Bot as it satisfies
rule 3 of token bot selection. Bot 1 completes its action at t5; however, Bot 1 has
performed two actions triggering an E4 and E5 event within the BotHunter threshold ‘T’
time period leading to detection by BotHunter.
3.10.2 Solution to Token Pass Flaw
The flaw could be rectified by excluding rule 3 for selection of the next token bot.
During a token pass, if there are no bots which satisfies rule 1 and rule 2, the token bot
will wait until such time a bot that satisfies rule 1 or rule 2 comes into existence.
3.10.3 Timestamp Flaw
In the current design, each bot stores the time at which it performed an action (E3,
E4 event). This time is based on the time in the local computer. It could be possible that
the times in some computers in a network might differ. If such be the case, a problem
during the token acquisition response propagation (TARP) could result. When the TARP
message is being passed around, each bot checks to see if the timestamp in the report list
in the TARP message is greater than the timestamp of the report list it is currently
storing. If it is greater, it is accepted; otherwise, it is rejected.
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The problem with using timestamps for report lists is illustrated by the
following scenario, in which three computers have the same time, while the fourth one is
behind the other three by t minutes. As shown in Table 10, Bot 1 completes its action at
t1, Bot 2 completes its action at t2, Bot 3 completes its action at t3, and Bot 4 completes
its action at t4.
After completing its action, Bot 1 passes the report list as part of the TARP
message, and the other bots accept the message as the timestamp (t1) that is greater than
the initial timestamp (0) stored in them. Similarly, Bot 3 passes the report list as part of
the TARP message, and the other bots accept the message as the timestamp (t3) is greater
than the timestamp (t2) stored in them.

Table 10 Timestamp Flaw.
Tim
e
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en
Bot
Bot
1

Action

TARP Report List
Timestamp

Binary
Download

Bot 2

Bot 3

Bot 4

t1

t1

t1

Bot 1 passes
token to Bot 2

t2

Bot
2

Command
Update

Bot 1
t2

Bot 3
t2

Bot 4
t2

Bot 2 passes
token to Bot 3

t3

Bot
3

Peer List
Update

Bot 1
t3

Bot 2
t3

Bot 4
t3

Bot 3 passes
token to Bot 4

t4

Bot
4

Binary
Download

Bot 1 rejects
the Report
List since
t4<t3

Bot 2
rejects
the
Report
List
since
t4<t3

Bot 3
rejects
the
Report
List
since
t4<t3

t1

Token Pass

No Token Pass
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However, since the computer hosting Bot 4 is running behind the other
infected computers, the timestamp (t4) of Bot 4 is lesser than the timestamp (t3) of the
report list in the other bots. Hence, the TARP message is rejected by the other bots. Since
all the bots have rejected the TARP message, the token bot will not receive the TARP
acknowledgement from other bots and hence will not perform a token pass, leading to a
collapse of the botnet.
3.10.4 Solution to Timestamp Flaw
The above problem could be avoided by eliminating use of the timestamp to
determine the latest report list. The alternative is to use an action counter to determine the
latest report list. The action counter indicates the total number of actions performed by
the botnet. The solution is illustrated by the following scenario, in which three computers
have the same time, while the fourth one is behind the other three by t minutes. As shown
in Table 11, initially Bot 1, which is in the token bot state, performs the binary download
and increments the action counter to 1.
Table 11. Action Counter Solution.
Time

Token

Action

Action

Bot Number - action counter

Bot

Counter

t1

Bot 1

1

Binary

Bot 2 - 1

Bot 3 –
1

Bot 4 1

Bot 2

t2

Bot 2

2

Command

Bot 3 -2

Bot 3

3

Peer list

t4

Bot 4

4

Binary

Bot 1 - 4

Bot 4 2
Bot 4 3
Bot 3 4

Bot 3

t3

Bot 1 2
Bot 1 - 3

Bot 2 3
Bot 2 4

Token Pass

Bot 4
Bot 2

55
It then propagates the action counter as part of the TARP to the other bots.
Similarly, Bot 2 performs its action and increments the action counter. When Bot 4
finally becomes the token bot, it performs its action, increments the action counter, and
passes it on to rest of the botnet. The TARP is accepted by the other bots even though Bot
4 is behind in time. The Botnet operation continues unhindered.
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CHAPTER 4
IMPLEMENTATION OF DEFENSE
AGAINST COVERT BOTNET
This chapter presents the concept for the defense against the covert botnet
proposed in [12]. It explains the implementation details of the key components in the
defense system, the experimental set up, the experiments conducted, and the results
obtained to validate the concept.
4.1 Overview of Defense System
BotHunter monitors the traffic entering or leaving a network and detects all E3
through E5 events; however, it does not monitor the traffic within the local network and,
hence, does not detect an internal to internal exploit (A2 event), internal to internal binary
acquisition (A3 event), to internal command and control communication (A4 event). In
order to detect these events, this thesis proposes a local traffic monitoring system
(LTMS).
4.2 Rules for Detection
In order to declare the existence of a Bot infection either one the following
conditions has to be satisfied.
•

An internal to external binary acquisition (E3) event that is followed by an
A2 event within the BotHunter threshold time period.

•

An internal to external binary acquisition (E3) event that is followed by an
A3 event within the BotHunter threshold time period.
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•

An internal to external C&C communication (E4) event that is followed
by an A4 event within the BotHunter threshold time period.

4.3

Components of Defense System
The key components of the Defense are the 1) Local Traffic Monitoring System

and 2) the BotHunter.

4.4 Local Traffic Monitoring System
The local traffic monitoring system (LTMS) analyzes the traffic flowing through
the network switch to detect and report A2, A3, and A4 events. The three main
components of LTMS are the internal event detector, internal event dispatcher, and
central event aggregator. There may be one or more internal event detectors and internal
event dispatchers in the system. They exchange information with the centrally located
event aggregator, which in turn liaisons with BotHunter.
4.4.1

Internal Event Detectors
The internal event detectors analyze the traffic local within the network for

signatures. A signature is a raw sequence of bytes or strings. These raw sequences of
bytes or strings are present in the bot binary or commands. As shown in Figure 18, this
component may be an application running on a computer that gains access to local traffic
by connecting to a network switch configured for port mirroring or it may be an
application that is resident in the network switch itself.
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This component does not maintain a database of signatures but instead relies on
the signature database that is available in BotHunter. BotHunter internally uses Snort,
which has an extensive database of signatures. Snort produces an alert message when an
E3 through E4 event is detected. This alert message consists of the signature that was
found in the network traffic from the remote command and control center.
Since, the same binary or command that was downloaded during an E3 through
E4 event is propagated across the local network by the covert bot, the internal event
detector utilizes the signature contained in the alert message generated by Snort in
BotHunter for analyzing the local traffic. Unlike the signature inspector proposed in [27]
in the signature-aware traffic monitoring with IPFIX, this component does not need a
database of signatures. This results in four benefits.
•

Memory. Since it stores only the recent signature sent by BotHunter it
requires far less memory than it would if has to have the entire database of
signatures.

•

Computational Load. The computational requirements are greatly reduced
since we need to search for only one signature.

•

Time. The time needed to analyze the network traffic is reduced.

•

Speed. The speed at which network traffic can be analyzed is increased.

Once the A3 through A4 event is detected by this component, the time of
detection, the type of event (A3, A4), the internet protocol address of the computers
participating in the events, and the signature id are sent to the internal event dispatcher.
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4.4.2 Internal Event Dispatcher
This component formats the information related to an A3 through A4 event
provided by the internal event detector in the form of a Snort alert message. This alert
message is then passed on to the central event aggregator. This component is also
responsible for receiving the signature from the central event aggregator and passing it on
to the internal event detector.
4.4.3 Central Event Aggregator
This component receives the signature from BotHunter that was used in detecting
the E3 through E4 event. It passes the signature on to one or more Internal Event
Dispatchers. It also forwards alerts from one or more internal event dispatchers to
BotHunter.
4.5 BotHunter
BotHunter sends the signature that was used in identifying the E3 through E4
events to the central event aggregator. It correlates the external events with the internal
events provided by the central event aggregator and signals a bot infection if it matches
one of the rules for detection as outlined in Section 4.2.
4.6 Implementation of Local Traffic Monitoring System
Instead of building a proprietary protocol for the exchange of information
between the components in the LTMS, this paper proposes using the Internet protocol
flow information export (IPFIX) protocol. IPFIX is the universal standard for export of
flow information to enable network measurement, accounting, and billing. A metering
process called exporter located at a router or switch analyzes network traffic and
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aggregates information about the network traffic. The exporter then transmits the flow
of information to the collectors. The data collected from the various exporters is
subsequently used for network measurement.
The internal event detector needs to analyze the data packets in the network, and
since the exporter in IPFIX collects data packets and has access to the data packets in the
network, the internal event detector is built as an internal module in exporter in order to
access the data packets and analyze them.
The exporter in IPFIX also sends the flow information to the collector. In
addition, it can send user data. The exporter is used for building the internal event
dispatcher, and the alert message is sent as part of the user data along with the flow
information.
The collector is used for building the central event aggregator. This will aggregate
the alert messages sent as part of the user-defined data by the exporters and pass them on
to BotHunter and also send the signature to one or more internal event dispatchers.
4.7 Modifications to IPFIX-compliant Flow Generator
Libipfix [32] is a c-library that implements the IPFIX protocol was used for
building the LTMS. The following changes were made in the exporter and collector.
•

Exporter. This component was modified to implement the internal event
detector. The internal event detector uses the Boyer–Moore [33] string
search algorithm to analyze the traffic for signatures. A TCP socket server
module was added to the exporter to receive signatures from the central
event aggregator.
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•

Collector. This component was modified to implement the central event
aggregator. It sends the signature received from BotHunter to one or many
internal event dispatchers. Additionally, it sends the alert message
received as part of an IPFIX message from the one or more exporters to
BotHunter.

•

IPFIX Message. A new flow template was created to include the alert
message. The alert message consists of the time of detection of the event,
which was necessary for BotHunter to correlate external and internal
events, the type of event, and the signature id.

4.8 Modifications to BotHunter
BotHunter was modified to send the signature id along with the signature
identified in the E3 or E4 event and the type of event, i.e., E3 or E4, to the central event
aggregator. It was also programmed to receive alerts from the central event aggregator.
4.9 Detection Steps
•

As shown in Figure 19, BotHunter detects an E3 through E4 event when the
covert bot downloads the binary or command from the external peer.

•

The signature used in indentifying the E3 through E4 event is propagated to
the central event aggregator. The central event aggregator may be in the same
computer as BotHunter or in a different computer, as shown in Figure 19.

•

The central event aggregator propagates the signature to one or more internal
event detectors.

63

Correlation of E3-E4 with A2-A4 event leading
to discovery of Bot Infection

Propagation of Alert
Message

BotHunter

Detection of E3- E4 event
and Propagation of
Signature Information

Central Event Aggregator
Propagation of Signature Information

Internal Event Detectors and
Dispatchers
Detection of A2-A4 event and Propagation of
Alert Messages

Figure 19. Detection steps.
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•

The internal event detector detects the A2-A4 events using the signature, and
the internal event dispatcher propagates the alert message to the central event
aggregator.

•

The central event aggregator then forwards the alert message to BotHunter.

•

If the E3 through E4 events and the A2 through A4 events are within the
threshold time, a bot infection is declared.

4.10

Analysis of Defense Mechanism

4.10.1 Experiment Setup
•

Covert Bot Application. This application implemented the functionality of
the covert bot. It was written in C++. It performs binary download, and
command download from the remote command and control server.
External Peer Application. This application simulated the remote
command and control server. When a bot requests a bot binary, the bot
binary it is sent through TCP.

•

Local Network. As shown in Figure 20, the local network was simulated
on VMware consisting of 40 computers. Thirty virtual computers running
on the Ubuntu Linux Operating system were hosted on a VMware ESX
server. These computers were connected to a virtual switch on the
VMware ESX server. The other 10 computers running Ubuntu Linux
Operating system were hosted on a VMware workstation that was running
on top of a Linux server. The computers were connected to a physical
switch.
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•

Central Event Aggregator. This application was run on a Linux desktop
computer, as show in Figure 20.

•

Internal Event Detector and Dispatcher. Two internal event detectors and
dispatchers were used for the experiments. One of them was run on a
virtual computer hosted on the VMware ESX server and monitored the
traffic in the virtual switch, while the other was hosted on an Ubuntu
Linux desktop and monitored the physical switch.
I implemented and ran the Internal Event Detector, Dispatcher and
the Centralized Event Aggregator on a desktop computer. These
components utilized the signature database present in Snort. Using the
single signature database enables them to analyze the network traffic with
lesser CPU and memory utilization, which would be necessary if
implemented on a network switch, since switches have limited memory
and processing power.

•

External Network. The external network consisted of a single Linux
desktop computer that hosted the external peer application.

•

BotHunter. This application was hosted on the same Linux desktop
computer as the central event aggregator.
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4.10.2 CPU Utilization
The CPU utilization of the internal signature detector application was dependent
on the network bandwidth and on the signature database size. The internal signature
detector analyzed the traffic for occurrences of signatures. If the signature database size
was large and the volume of the traffic was high, the application spent more time in
analyzing the traffic thereby increasing CPU utilization of the application.
This can be seen in Figure 21, wherein CPU utilization reached 100% when the
network bandwidth was more than 15000 KBs per second and the signature database size
was 350. However, if the size of signature database was 5, CPU utilization did not go
beyond 45% even with a network bandwidth of 21000 KBs per second.
The internal signature detector had to be present at vantage points in the local
network to analyze the traffic and detect the A2 through A4 events. Having a huge
database of signatures at each and every location would not only increase redundancy but
also increase CPU utilization when analyzing traffic. Hence, it made it advantageous to
have only one centralized database of signatures available in BotHunter and propagate
the signature detected during an E3 through E4 event to one or more internal signature
detectors, which in turn use them to analyze the local traffic and detect the A2 through
A4 events.
4.10.2 Network Data Processed versus
Signature Database Size
This experiment was conducted with 4140.4 KB (size of the covert bot binary) of
data being transferred in the network. As the network data was being transferred, the
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Figure 21. CPU utilization.
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internal signature detector copied it in to its internal buffer to compare the received
data with the signatures in the database. As the signature database size increased, the
amount of network data analyzed by the internal signature detector decreased, since the
internal buffer could not be analyzed quickly because of the increased signature database.
As illustrated in, Figure 22 the internal signature detector was able to analyze all
the traffic in network when the database size was less than 6; however, when the database
size increased, the size of data being analyzed by it decreased. This could potentially lead
to missing the internal binary or commands being propagated in the network. The
experiment was conducted three times.
4.10.4 Time Delay
The LTMS had to receive the signature identified by BotHunter without much
time delay. As illustrated in Figure 23, when there was a time delay of 0.3 seconds, some
of the 30 bots participating in the A3 events were not detected. This is because the covert
bot propagated the binary (A3) to the rest of the botnet before the signature was received
by the LTMS. A further increase in the time delay decreased the number of bots detected.
The experiment was conducted three times. When the time delay was 0.8 seconds the
average number of bots detected was 22 bots. Thus, it is critical to transfer the signature
identified by BotHunter to the LTMS as soon as possible.
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Figure 22. Network data processing.
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Figure 23. Bots detected vs time delay.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
5.1 Contribution
Security analysts create new defense mechanisms against attacks, and
attackers find new ways of defeating existing defense mechanisms to create havoc for
private computer users and businesses alike. This cat and mouse game will continue in
the future. Technologies that benefit the people are hijacked by attackers for malevolent
purposes. IRC channels have been developed for people to communicate, exchange files,
etc. However, this technology has been misused by attackers to create botnets to carry out
malicious activities. Initially, botnets created by attackers were based on a centralized
command and control, and techniques were devised accordingly to detect these botnets.
However, attackers have come up with botnets that utilize the peer-to-peer
networks which are harder to detect. Hence, it is necessary for researchers to detect
vulnerabilities in current defense mechanisms before the attackers can find them. The
authors of [12] have proposed a new model of bot infection that is different from existing
models. It is not only necessary to propose a new model but also demonstrate that the
new model is viable by implementing and fine-tuning it by conducting experiments.
This thesis presents implementation of the framework for a covert botnet
communication in a private subnet. The purpose of said implementation is to show that
the new model of bot infection is as potent as the existing botnet models while doing a
better job of maintaining stealth and evading detection from current detection
mechanisms such as BotHunter. I carried out experiments by simulating an infection in a
computer network using the new model and showed that the attack is successfully able to

73
maintain stealth and evade detection. I have also suggested some improvements to the
new model of bot infection to make it more robust.
Research in computer security should not stop at finding vulnerabilities. Rather, it
should leave no stone unturned to finding ways to prevent detection and exploitation of
vulnerabilities by attackers. Consequently, in this thesis, I have also designed a defense
mechanism against the new model of bot infection.
This design involves monitoring the local traffic within a network using the
signature identified by BotHunter during an external event (E3, E4) and sending alert
messages using the IPFIX protocol to BotHunter when an internal event (A2-A4) is
detected. This enables BotHunter to correlate external events with internal events to
detect bot infection. I have implemented the new design and carried out experiments,
wherein I simulated a bot infection in a computer network and successfully detected the
bot infection.
5.2 Future Work
There is no defense mechanism that is absolutely foolproof, so there is scope for
improving the defense mechanism proposed and implemented in this paper. Firstly, the
implementation used in this paper uses only substring matching for signature
identification which is sufficient for an A2, A3, or A4 internal events. This could be
improved by adding more complex rule matching techniques like regular expressions.
Secondly, when there is a hierarchical structure of switches in a network,
redundancy in the alert messages being sent to BotHunter occurs. For instance, if a bot in
a computer connected to switch 1 propagates a binary to another bot hosted in another
computer connected to switch 2, the internal signature detectors monitoring switch 1 and
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switch 2 both send alert messages to the central event aggregator. Techniques to
eliminate this redundant information being propagated could be another source of future
work.
Thirdly, the defense mechanism works fine when the computer that performs the
Binary, Command, Peer List download (E3, E4 external events), resides in the same
subnet while performing the internal propagation (A2-A4 internal events). This allows
my defense mechanism to detect both the external event and the internal events. This may
not be true in all scenarios as illustrated by the following case. People carry their laptops
from home to the workplace or college and the subnets they are part of changes as they
do it. A bot in a Laptop may perform the E3, E4 external events when the host is
connected to the home subnet and then when the victim carries the laptop to the
workplace the bot subsequently perform the binary propagation to the other computers in
the workplace.
The Local Traffic Monitoring System would not be able to detect the internal
propagation as the BotHunter in the workplace is unaware of the external events.
Detection of such infections would be another improvement to the existing Defense
mechanism.
Finally, the concept of using a centralized signature database and using the
signature detected at the router and propagating to monitors present within network
switches can be extended to other devices such as PDA’s, Mobile Phones, etc., which
like the Network Switch have less memory and processing capabilities and replicating the
signature database in them will be redundant. In the future Ubiquitous computing will
become popular and households will contain ambient devices with networking
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capabilities. These devices can be potentially be exploited by attackers. Hence
Monitors can be built into the ambient devices which utilize a centralized database of
signatures, this would reduce the processing and memory needed to analyze the network
traffic.
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